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The purpose of this research is to find out if Microsoft Active Directory could offer authentication 
services for multiple tenants without cross-tenant visibility. The focus of this research is Active 
Directory Organizational Units and those objects that commonly reside in them. This thesis 
approaches Multi-Tenancy by implementing Active Directory lock-down rules to default schema, 
effectively modifying default access and visibility permissions. These modifications prove to be 
very effective in blocking cross-tenant visibility and are the basis for Active Directory Multi-
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MULTI-TENANT ACTIVE DIRECTORY 
Tämän tutkimuksen tarkoitus on selvittää voidaanko yhteen Microsoft Active Directory 
toteutukseen liittää monia asiakkuuksia ilman että asiakkaat tietävät toistensa olemassaolosta, 
ja näin ollen tarjota useille asiakkuuksille autentikointipalvelua. Tutkimuksen kohteena ovat 
Active Directoryn Organizational Unitit, sekä näissä yleisimmin sijaitsevat oliot. Tutkimus 
keskittyy lukitun Active Directoryn ajatukseen ja näiden ajatusten toteuttamiseen default 
schema objektien käyttöoikeusasetuksiin. Nämä muutokset osoittautuvat erittäin tehokkaiksi 
estämään asiakkuuksia näkemästä toisiaan ja ovat tutkimuksen lähtökohta. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
ADUC Active Directory Users and Computers tool. A systems 
administrator performs user account operations with this tool 
e.g. resets user passwords. 
LDAP Lightweight Directory Access Protocol that is used to access 
Directory Services. 
LDP Lightweight Directory Protocol. An old tool created by 
Microsoft to directly access Active Directory and to create 
custom LDAP queries. 
Locked-Down A Locked Down Active Directory is a Directory Service where 
Directory objects are stripped from unnecessary access 
control rules. 
OU Organizational Unit. A placeholder for objects in Active 
Directory. 
SaaS Software as a service. Effectively this means: one system 
with multiple clients without cross client visibility. 
Tenant A tenant is a synonym for a 3rd party or client. When there 
are multiple tenants it means multiple 3rd parties that should 
be unaware of each other. 
 
 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Microsoft Directory Services is a server side software made by Microsoft for 
identity management that is included as an optional component in all Microsoft 
Windows Server Standard, Enterprise, and Datacenter operating systems. The 
main use of identity management is authorization. Some examples of 
authorization could be illustrated by the following questions: is the user 
authorized to log in to this computer? Are these credentials authorized to 
access this document? Microsoft Directory Services identity management 
solution is established on the idea of a user name that everyone might know 
and a password that only the authorized user knows. If one of these is lost, one 
can not gain access to the service and must ask help from a Domain 
Administrator to gain the lost user name or a new password. Once a Domain 
Services is installed, it is given a name and is called a forest and inside this 
forest there is at least one domain. In most cases, like the one in this thesis, the 
forest contains one domain and can be thought as the same thing. Once a 
domain is created, an authenticated user can read 
The Directory Services is like a file system with folders and files, except that 
these folders are called Organizational Units and the files are called objects. 
These objects vary like files and some are called user objects, some are group 
objects, and others are computer objects. These three objects are the most 
important objects for this thesis and these objects store user, or computer, 
information like passwords, group membership information, and unique 
identifiers. A computer, user, or a group can be a member of a group and 
usually a group is given the right to access a certain object. These permissions 
can be given directly or by inheriting them from a parent object like from the 
organizational unit where the object is located. These permissions are usually 
given to groups with descriptive names, for ease of administration, and users 
are joined to a group to gain access to the desired object. 
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When a new object is created in the Directory Service, it is created from the 
information located in the schema. The schema is a storage location containing 
all templates of all objects and can be modified as pleased. One can even break 
the whole Directory Services beyond repair by meddling with the schema too 
much. The templates located in the schema specify all information like a group 
object is a group object and not an user object, that is given a specific access 
control list, which are the most important part of this thesis, and by modifying 
these access control lists we can restrict user access from the beginning, 
meaning we are able to block users from parts of the Directory Service. These 
permissions can be blocked or allowed at any time after the object creation by a 
Domain Administrator or similar entity with the required permissions. 
The idea for a multi-tenant Microsoft Active Directory came with questions 
‘What are these access control rules in Directory objects?’, ‘Can we block 
access to Active Directory objects with access control rules?’ and ‘Do these 
work like NTFS file permissions?’. In order to answer these questions, a new 
Active Directory was created, modified and thoroughly tested in order to find out 
whether multiple clients can coexist in one Active Directory implementation, 
without cross-client visibility. System Administrator can restrict Active Directory 
object access and visibility by removing unnecessary entries from objects, and 
even create new objects with a premade access control list. Using these 
principles, the Active Directory was modified and thoroughly tested for object 
access breaches while simulating separated clients. 
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2 ACTIVE DIRECTORY MULTI-TENANCY 
This research answers the question ‘Can Microsoft Active Directory identity 
services be offered as SaaS (Software As a Service) for multiple clients?’. 
Microsoft Active Directory does not natively support multi-tenancy without cross-
client object visibility, but one can remove object visibility with access control 
lists by denying read permissions or by removing permissions that grant read 
access to the object in question thus creating separated Organizational Units 
(OU’s). However these changes may break important functionality of the 
directory services with poorly planned access restrictions, which could lead to a 
situation where the Directory can not read itself. 
Due to the large amount of different functionalities in Microsoft Active Directory, 
the research scope is narrowed down to Active Directory Organizational Units 
and those objects that commonly reside in them, as they are the founding 
stones in creating separated entities for multi-tenancy in Active Directory. This 
research focuses on user, group and computer objects in addition to 
Organizational Units because they are needed for basic authentication services. 
2.1 Directory Structure 
A new Active Directory implementation was created and two new Organizational 
Units were created to the forest root ‘Clients’ Organizational Unit and ‘IAAS 
Provider’ Organizational Unit. The ‘Computers’ and ‘Users’ containers were not 
taken into use and all new objects were redirected to a new container inside 
IAAS Provider: “OU=_NewObjects,OU=IAAS 
Provider,DC=test,DC=turkuamk,DC=local” . 
Each client is given their own personal Organizational Unit inside the ‘Clients’ 
Organizational Unit. Permissions to modify objects inside their personal 
Organizational Unit are given to the client administrator group. As a general 
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rule, all client specific data is located only inside the clients’ client specific 
Organizational Unit. 
2.2 Object Security 
Microsoft Active Directory object permissions are ‘Like file permissions in NTFS’ 
(Sanderson & Rice, 2000, 25) By default, ‘All users who log on with a valid 
username and password combination that is stored in the Active Directory 
database belong to the special identity group Authenticated Users’ (Kane 2009, 
112). Because the Authenticated Users group has read permissions to all 
objects in the domain by default, all clients can view all objects by default. There 
are two ways this access to an object could be removed: 
Firstly, all undesired group permissions could be removed from objects. E.g. all 
permissions could be removed from all Comapny1’s objects except 
Company1_Users. This way Company2_Users would not have access to the 
Company1’s objects. 
Secondly, it is possible to specifically deny access from Company2_Users to 
Company1’s Organizational Unit. With a deny statement, a user can not access 
the resource, because an explicit deny statement always overrules an explicit 
allow rule. On the other hand an explicit allow rule overrides an inherited deny 
rule, which creates a very complicated situation because of many overlapping 
deny and allow statements are very hard to read correctly. 
Unfortunately, the deny rule would have to be added to each client every time a 
new client would be brought to the domain. This leaves us with the option to 
remove all unnecessary permissions from all objects as the only realistic choice 
so that all new clients brought to the domain are not automatically allowed to 
see all objects. 
In order to remove all unnecessary permissions, the necessary permissions 
need to be defined. Permissions can be categorized in three groups by access 
need: system access, administrative access, and user access. System Access 
includes object operations where the system accesses the object because of a 
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system-initiated reason. Administrative Access includes all object operations 
initiated from within Active Directory by a user. User Access includes all object 
operations initiated from outside Active Directory by a user. 
A Schema of a new unmodified Windows 2008 R2 Directory Services has the 
following abbreviations (also known as ‘well known names’) in the default 
security description of Organizational Units: SY, DA, AO, PO, AU, and ED. 
These abbreviations of the well known names translate in the security tab of a 
new object to the following group names: 
SYSTEM (SY) which is ‘used by the operating system and any processes that 
run using LocalSystem’ (Kane 2009, 112) LocalSystem is a server side service 
account used to run operating system processes. 
Domain Admins (DA) which is the default group of the domain for workstation 
administrative tasks (Kane 2009, 109) and for domain-wide upkeep tasks. 
Account Operators (AO) whose purpose is to ‘administer domain user and 
group accounts. By default, members can create, modify, and delete accounts 
for users, groups, and computers in all containers and Organizational Units 
(OU’s) of Active Directory, except the Built-in folder and the Domain Controllers 
OU.’ (Kane 2009, 106). This means daily tasks such as creating user accounts 
and resetting passwords. 
Print Operators (PO) group ‘members can manage printers and document 
queues.’ (Kane 2009, 108). This means Active Directory Printer objects and 
workstation specific administrative tasks including document queues. 
Authenticated Users (AU) which is a group for ’all users who log on with a valid 
username and password combination that is stored in the Active Directory 
database.’ (Kane 2009, 112). This group has read access to all Directory 
objects. 
ENTERPRISE DOMAIN CONTROLLERS (ED) which is ‘used to facilitate 
access to forest-wide Active Directory services.’ (Kane 2009, 112) ‘All domain 
controllers are members of this group’ (Kane 2009, 112). 
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In addition to these explicit permissions, the object has inherited permissions for 
Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access which is a backwards compatibility 
group for Windows NT. ‘Members have read access on all users and groups in 
the domain. This group is provided for backward compatibility for computers 
running Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 and earlier.’ (Kane 2009, 108). 
SELF which is ‘used as a placeholder for the current user.’ (Kane 2009, 113). 
This statement means the object itself and not the user that is trying to access 
it. 
Enterprise Admins, which is used for the following ‘This group is added to the 
Administrator group on all domain controllers in the forest. This allows the 
global administrative privileges associated with this group, such as the ability to 
create and delete domains.’ (Kane 2009, 110). 
Administrators which is a group whose ’members have complete and 
unrestricted access to the computer or domain controller locally, including the 
right to change their own permissions.’ (Kane 2009, 107). 
These permissions can be categorized in the following way: 
System Access: SYSTEM, and ENTERPRISE DOMAIN CONTROLLERS 
Administrative Access: Domain Admins, Account Operators, Print Operators, 
Enterprise Admins, and Administrators 
Client Access: Authenticated User, Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access, and 
SELF 
Of these default permissions, the following are absolutely necessary for domain 
functionality: 
SYSTEM, because it means all processes running on the domain controller. 
Without SYSTEM, the computer can not access the process it is trying to run. 
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ENTERPRISE DOMAIN CONTROLLERS, because this default permission is 
used to grant access for domain controllers for domain wide active directory 
services, such as performing queries and Access Control List parsing. 
In order to secure domain functionality and allow Enterprise Admins to perform 
their designated tasks they need to be added to the necessary permissions list. 
The necessary permissions list has been defined: 
System Access: SYSTEM, and ENTERPRISE DOMAIN CONTROLLERS 
Administrative Access: Enterprise Admins 
Client Access: [none] 
In order to gain access in to resources, a client needs user groups that have 
been delegated necessary permissions. These groups should be Domain Local 
Security Groups, for security purposes, which are created for each client, are 
located in their respective Organizational Unit, and have been delegated read 
permission to client’s Organizational Unit. This allows client specific access to 
their own part of the shared infrastructure without compromising other clients. 
Further permission delegation can be made for client specific administrative 
groups. As stated in Hack Proofing Windows 2000 Server Security ‘security can 
be administrated with much more granularity and flexibility. One example is the 
ability to delegate administrative authority at OU level.’ (Todd & Johnson, 2001). 
Effectively, this means that one can delegate ‘modify’ or ‘full control’ 
permissions for each client into their own Organizational Unit and thus grant 
them the required permissions to perform user access control operations and 
administrative operations inside their Organizational Unit. 
2.3 Practical Tests 
Multiple tests were performed in order to find out if the theory about client 
invisibility holds true in different common scenarios. When a user tries to access 
an object without the necessary read permissions the user will receive an 
access denied or not found error message. In a normal Active Directory 
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implementation, all authenticated users have read access to all objects in the 
domain. In the domain described in this thesis, the regular functionality has 
been heavily modified and multiple tests were performed in order to see 
whether the regular functionality of Directory Services is working correctly. 
Four tests were performed in order to find out if the Organizational Unit 
structure can be made invisible, five tests were performed to delegate 
permissions for client self-administration, and three tests were carried out about 
joining computers to domain. 
The testing platform was a brand new Windows Server 2008 R2 with Domain 
Services installed in Windows 2008 R2 domain level with removed 
authenticated users permissions as described in this thesis. The following 
organizational unit directory structure was created 
OU=1,OU=Clients,DC=testi,DC=turkuamk,DC=local and 
OU=2,OU=Clients,DC=testi,DC=turkuamk,DC=local. Two client groups were 
created in to their respective Organizational Units, 1_Users and 2_Users. Read 
permissions were delegated to client-specific Organizational Units. Two users 
were created in their respective Organizational Units, user1 and user2 and they 
were added to their client specific user groups. 
In the first test, a blocked Organizational Unit object was accessed with ADUC 
(Active Directory Users and Computers tool). The test was made by logging in 
as user1 and opening the client OU with ADUC. The user saw two objects in it, 
1 and 2 of which 2 was unknown. Of these objects user1 could not access 2 
and could access 1.  While object 1 could be opened and its properties be 
looked at, object 2’s properties could not be opened. 
The first test revealed a flaw in enumeration because we can see the names of 
all child objects of an object we have permissions to read even if we do not 
have permissions to read the child object. As to the date of writing this thesis 
Microsoft has not released Access Based Enumeration for Directory Objects as 
they have done for NTFS file systems. This flaw can be circumvented by lacing 
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the actual client name inside an Organizational Unit without a meaningful name 
e.g OU=2,OU=1234,OU=Clients,DC=testi,DC=turkuamk,DC=local. 
In the second test, the dsquery tool was used to access a blocked 
Organizational Unit object through Global Catalog. A dsquery was run against 
client 2’s Organizational Unit 2 as user1: 
Dsquery ou “OU=2,OU=Clients,DC=testi,DC=turkuamk,DC=local” 
The result user1 obtained from this query was “dsqueryfailed:The specific 
directory service attribute or value does not exist.”. From this error message it 
can be determined that the test was a success. The object was completely 
inaccessible. 
In the third test, a blocked Organizational Unit object was accessed with an 
LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol used to access Directory 
Services) query, with LDP (Lightweight Directory Protocol) tool. The LDP tool 
was opened as user1 and used to access a blocked. A connection to the local 
server was made and it was binded to user1’s account. A queryobjectclass=* 
query was made against ‘OU=2,OU=Clients,DC=testi,DC=turkuamk,DC=local l’ 
This query lists everything in the specified location. User1 received one result 
from this query and that was DN: 
OU=2,OU=Clients,DC=testi,DC=turkuamk,DC=local. When user1 ran a query to 
directly access group 2_Users with LDP tool, user1 received a message: 
‘Getting 0 entries:’. 
The result from the third test was a success. User1 could not receive any 
information that was not supposed to be received, meaning the other client’s 
Organizational Unit. The same flaw that the first test revealed was present in 
this test, too. 
In the fourth test, a blocked Organizational Unit security tab was accessed, with 
ADUC, in order to see the security groups and their members. When 
OU=2,OU=Clients,DC=testi,DC=turkuamk,DC=local object properties was 
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opened with ADUC as user1 and security tab was selected the user received an 
error message stating “not enough permissions to view the permissions tab”. 
The fourth test was a success. User1 could not obtain any security information 
from a blocked object. 
By analyzing these four test results, one can determine that it is possible to 
have two clients in the same Directory without them knowing about each other. 
This statement is based on the fact that the objects can be made invisible and 
inaccessible to other objects such as users that have not explicitly been granted 
read permissions. In addition, one limitation was found: each client 
Organizational Unit needs to be placed inside another Organizational Unit with 
a name that has no actual meaning e.g. a number sequence, or else everyone 
can read the name. 
After these four tests to determine object invisibility, delegation tests were 
conducted for certain administrative permissions in order to test other basic 
Directory functionality, such as resetting passwords and joining workstations to 
domain. All tests were compared to commonly known results from these 
operations, e.g., resetting a password resets the user’s password. 
The next series of tests began with ‘User and Group object Administration’ as it 
is one of the most important parts of every IT infrastructure. User and Group 
objects are the user’s identity, and with identity the owner of the system can 
manage authorization. With authorization the owner can manage access to 
information and without proper authorization management the information is 
hard to get or even inaccessible. 
In theory, the client could want to obtain their identity provider and identity 
management services from two different providers. In this case, the identity 
management provider would not have any access to the entire directory but 
only to their client’s portion. This possibility was tested with Active Directory 
Delegation Model, and multiple tests were carried out to find out if the schema 
default permissions modifications broke something. 
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ADUC (Active Directory Users and Computers tool) delegate permissions ability 
was used to delegate user and group modification and creation permissions to a 
client administrative group in to the client specific OU. A test user account was 
added to this group and user upkeep operations were attempted. A total of five 
tests were performed. 
As the first test, a telephone number was added with the Active Directory 
command line tool dsmod to every Active Directory user. A new test user was 
created for client1 called user1_2. The excepted results were that user1 and 
user1_2 phone number should have changed and every other users phone 
numbers should be unchanged. ADUC was used to check the results of the 
dsmod operation. 
Using the Active Directory command line tool dsmod requires much care 
because it is easy to make mistakes that affect the whole domain, possibly 
overwriting object information. The command consisted of two parts: the query 
and the modification. The query part was: dsquery user –limit 0. The parameter 
limit 0 needs to be used or else the query does not find all user objects of the 
domain but only the first 100 (Microsoft Corporation, 2009). The results of this 
query were then passed to: dsmod user –tel “01001” –c. The –tel parameter 
changes the objects telephone number to the designated one (Microsoft 
Corporation, 2009) and the –c parameter means continue on error (Microsoft 
Corporation, 2009). The complete command was: dsquery user –limit 0 | dsmod 
user –tel “01001” –c 
Running this test as user1 showed two dsmod succeeded messages and many 
failed messages. These failed messages were from known system users which 
could not be modified by user1. When looking at user1’s telephone number with 
ADUC it showed the number was modified. User1_2 was also modified, but 
system accounts and other clients user accounts were unmodified. 
The test was a success. It was possible to modify a client’s users attributes 
without accidentally modifying other clients user accounts. 
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As the second test, user1 was given premissions to reset password in client1’s 
Organizational Unit. User1 reset their own password with ADUC, logged out 
and back in with the new password. User1 could log in with the new password 
and was able to reset user1_2’s password with ADUC. User1 tried to reset a 
password outside client1’s Organizational Unit, but it was not possible to find 
other users except Active Directory default users, and their passwords could not 
be reset. 
This test was a success, because a user password could be reset. Passwords 
outside the client’s Organizational Unit could not be reset. 
For the third test new groups were created with ADUC as user1. A group was 
created into the client’s own Organizational Unit and another group in the 
‘clients’ Organizational Unit. The group was successfully created in the client’s 
own Organizational Unit but user1 was unable to create a new group anywhere 
else. The error message was: ‘The user does not have the required 
permissions.’ 
This test was a success. Clients can create groups inside their Organizational 
Unit. 
As the fourth test, user1 was added to a test group with ADUC. Using ADUC 
user1 could add theirself to a newly created ‘Test1_group’ inside the client’s 
own Organizational Unit. User1 then proceeded to find another group, but was 
unable to find any except the Active Directory default groups. User1 tried to add 
itself to the domain users group and failed with the error: ‘Not enough 
permissions.’ 
This test was a success. Clients can add users to groups in their Organizational 
Unit, as expected. 
In the fifth test, a new user object was created in the client1 Organizational Unit 
with ADUC and another user object in the clients OU. 
For this test ADUC was opened as user1 and a third test user user1_3 was 
created inside the client1’s Organizational Unit. The user creation completed 
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without errors, but user1 was unable to remove the user from the group Domain 
Users, because the user did not have access rights to the group. All new user 
objects are automatically members of the domain users group. 
A new permission delegation was made with ADUC using a Domain 
Administrator account and the permission ‘remove member’ was added to 
Domain Users group for the test client’s administrative group, and the test was 
repeated. The fifth test was once again performed, but this time successfully. 
User1 tried to create a new user into clients Organizational Unit but failed with 
the error message: ‘not enough permissions’. 
The test was a success. Although the necessary permissions were not originally 
delegated for user removal from Domain Users group, the issue was corrected 
and user1 was successful in creating a new user account. 
All administrative tests were successfully implemented with desired results. All 
user account and group operations could be done inside the client OU, and user 
accounts or groups could not be modified outside the client OU, with the 
exception of Domain Users group that was specifically given the permission to 
remove users from this group, because the groups were either not found or the 
user did not have enough permissions to modify them. 
These tests show that the modifications of Active Directory default permissions 
were successful and permissions can be delegated to administrative tasks. 
Another important basic functionality of Directory Services is joining computers 
to a domain. This was tested with three tests. In order to perform these tests, 
the client1 administrative group was delegated permissions to create computer 
objects into their Organizational Unit and the permissions to designate which 
user accounts or groups can link a computer with a pre-made computer account 
into the domain. Certain automated functions were also tested, like joining a 
computer to domain. The excepted result was that the test would fail if the 
computer did not have a pre-made computer account, because the user does 
not have access to the ’_NewObjects’ OU by default. 
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In the first test, it was tested if user1 can join a workstation to the domain 
without a pre-made computer account. A laptop was joined to the domain as 
user1. A computer object was automatically created into the new objects 
Organizational Unit, but the domain join failed, because the computer object did 
not have enough permissions to read itself and thus was not found. 
The test was a partial success, because domain join failed but the computer 
object was created. The only way around of this ‘computer object was created 
in the default computer location’ problem would be to pre create the computer 
object in to the desired pace as tested in the next test. 
For the second test, it was tested if a workstation can be joined to the domain 
with a pre-made computer account. A computer object was created as user1 
using ADUC and the permission to link a computer to the object was given to 
the client administrative group. Then a laptop was joined to the pre-made object 
and a ‘successfully joined a domain’ message was received. 
This test was a success. It is possible to join workstations to premade domain 
computer accounts. 
The third test was performed to see if automated operations can be made, e.g., 
form a two server cluster. Forming a cluster automatically creates a new 
computer account for the cluster name in the default new objects Organizational 
Unit. Forming a cluster was attempted from two Windows Server 2008 R2 
Enterprise Edition servers. The cluster was not formed, because of a time out. 
The cluster object was created in the new objects Organizational Unit, but the 
cluster could not find it due to insufficient read permissions. This test was 
repeated as a Domain Admin user and the cluster formed correctly. 
The test was repeated using Windows Server 2012 Standard Edition servers, 
because these servers have enchanced clustering services. The cluster formed 
correctly with the credentials of user1. The reason for this was that the cluster 
virtual name computer account resided in the same Organizational Unit as the 
cluster node computer accounts which means that the cluster has read access 
to its virtual object immediately. 
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This test was a partial fail as the cluster could not form with user1’s credentials 
and the client would need Directory Services providers help for forming clusters. 
This problem only exists for servers older than Windows Server 2012, as 
Windows Server 2012 forms cluster virtual names automatically to the same 
Organizational Unit where the cluster nodes reside. 
The tests were successful. It was possible to perform all basic administrative 
tasks without problems and work around certain other problems, such as 
forming clusters with the help of a Domain Administrator. 
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3 ANALYSING RESULTS 
In this thesis, a theory was made about object access and visibility blocking in 
Microsoft Active Directory, while retaining original functionality for the user’s 
own objects. These modifications required extensive testing because of the 
complexity of access control rules. All basic object operations and basic domain 
functionality worked as they should, with limitations that can be circumvented. 
These limitations are first level object enumeration, which means that when an 
object is selected the child object names can be read even if the user does not 
have permissions to them, and cluster forming with Windows 2008 R2 servers 
or older that can not be done without help from a Domain Administrator, which 
can not be delegated as the virtual server object is created in to the new objects 
container that is a blocked Organizational Unit. The tests show that all basic 
functionality was available in an Active Directory with reduced object 
permissions. Effectively this means that it is possible to make very large 
Directories with possibly hundreds of clients, all pinned to their own 
Organizational Units without cross-client visibility. 
However, this thesis does not cover all aspects of Microsoft Active Directory. 
Instead, this thesis provides a basis for future research on the field of Microsoft 
Active Directory Multi-Tenancy. Important aspects that were not researched 
include DNS, subnets, and forest trusts. 
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4 CONCLUSION 
Multi-tenant Active Directory is possible. The limitations that were found can be 
circumvented. These limitations were Access-Based Enumeration and cluster 
forming. Forming clusters does not work because it is an automated process 
that places objects inside the default new object container and tries to modify 
the object, which is prevented. All allowed object operations work as intended 
even with limited access control lists, meaning that clients can access their own 
objects and do not have access to, or even visibility of, other clients objects. 
In this thesis, a new Active Directory service was created and its schema was 
modified from each new object’s access control list. All unnecessary static 
access rules were removed. Whenever new objects are created, Active 
Directory permission delegation grants them inherited access control rules for 
directory objects residing in client OU’s, thus allowing client-specific object 
access. This boiled down to restricted access to all new parts of Active 
Directory retaining almost all original functionality and restricting access to all 
new parts of the domain. 
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Appendix 1: Forest Creation Answer File 
The following answer file was used to create the test forest: 
[DCInstall] 
InstallDNS=Yes 
NewDomain=Forest 
NewDomainDNSName=test.local 
DomainNetBiosName=test 
ReplicaOrNewDomain=domain 
ForestLevel=4 
DomainLevel=4 
DatabasePath="D:\NTDS" 
LogPath="D:\Log" 
SYSVOLPath="D:\SYSVol" 
ConfirmGc=Yes 
RebootOnSuccess=Yes 
 
